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Determinants of merger and acquisition activity in the food industry are analyzed using
logit regression analysis. Factors affecting the food processing, food retailing and food
service sectors are considered. Results indicate merger and acquisition activity in all
three sectors  are significantly  influenced by anti-trust activity, profitability and real gross
domestic product.
During  the  1980s,  there was  extensive mer-  among  the  largest  in  size  and  make  up  a  large
ger and acquisition activity within the food indus-  proportion, by value, of total merger activity. The
try. Mergers  occur as two or more firms combine  food industry ranked  fifth in the value  of merger
into a single organization,  and  acquisitions  occur  transactions  recorded  between  1982  and  1991.
as  one  firm  purchases  business  units of another  The  largest  transactions  recorded  in  1986,  1988
firm. While this  activity has  decreased  during the  and  1989  were  food  acquisitions.  Second,  the
1990s,  it  has,  by  no  means,  become  trivial.  As  food industry has many characteristics  that differ-
exhibited  in Figure  1, the number of mergers and  entiate  it  from  other  industries  and  may  have
acquisitions  ranged  from  291  to  584  between  unique  factors  motivating  its  merger  activity.
1982  and 1994.  Since  1991, the number of merg-  While there is extensive work on determinants of
ers  and  acquisitions  has  increased  from  291  to  mergers  and  acquisitions  for  the  aggregate  U.S.
433. All major sectors of the food industry includ-  economy,  and  manufacturing  and mining  indus-
ing  manufacturing,  wholesaling,  retailing  and  tries, these studies have provided little insight into
food  service  have  experienced  merger  activity.  overall  merger  and  acquisition  trends  especially
Padberg  et  al  note  that  merger  and  acquisition  for  the  food  industry. Third,  merger  frequencies
activity  leads  to  "a  more  clearly  defined  con-  vary greatly  among  industries  (Gort).. During the
glomerate  structure  in  food  manufacturing  and  merger  movement  in  the  1980s,  activity  in  the
greater  market concentration  in parts of the food  food  industry  peaked  two  years  later  than  other
sector."  Indeed,  mergers  and  acquisitions  ac-  industrial sectors and the number of food mergers
counted for two-thirds  of the increase  in concen-  decreased  at a faster  rate  than in  other industries
tration in  food  manufacturing  between  1977  and  after this period (Nayda).  Fourth, the food  indus-
1988  (Marion  and  Kim).  Similar trends  are  evi-  try is very diverse and may have varying determi-
dent in  other sectors  of the food  industry.  While  nants  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  within  the
many studies have investigated effects of mergers  industry.  Figures  2,  3,  and  4  show  merger  and
in the food  industry, few studies have  focused  on  acquisition  activity  in  the  food  processing,  food
the  determinants  of  mergers  and  acquisitions.  retailing  and food  service  sectors behaves  differ-
Since  mergers  and  acquisitions  may  affect  the  ently. Merger  and acquisition  activity in the food
structure  of the  food  industry,  it  is  important  to  retailing and food service sectors  peaked in  1986
understand the motives of such activities.  while  activity  in  the  food  processing  sector
Understanding  the  determinants  of  merger  peaked  in  1988.  Further,  merger  and  acquisition
and  acquisition  activity  in  the  food  industry  is  activity  declined  in  the  food  processing  sector
important for four reasons.  First, mergers and  ac-  over the past two years but  increased  in both the
quisitions  in  the  food  industry  typically  rank  food retailing and food service sectors.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to  determine
motivating factors  behind merger  and acquisition
Authors  are Econometrician,  American  Express;  Associate  ativt  in  t  foo  indur  ir  e  identi
Professor,  and  Professor,  respectively,  Department  of Agri-  adeterinnts  of  merer  ndu  acquisition  atifty
cultural Economics, Texas A&M University.  determinants  of merger  and  acquisition  activity
that have  been used  in  modeling  sectors  outside2  July 1997  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
of the  food  industry.  Then  characteristics  which  the food  industry. We partition  the food  industry
differentiate  the food  industry from other sectors  into four components;  (1)  processing;  (2)  whole-
of the U.S.  economy  are explored. From this  dis-  saling;  (3)  retailing;  and  (4)  food  service.  The
cussion, a model is developed to analyze determi-  food service sector includes both commercial and
nants  for  merger  and  acquisition  activity  within  non-commercial  restaurants.
Figure 1. Food Marketing Mergers and Acquisitions.
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Previously Hypothesized  Determinants of  tax  credits  or  accumulated  tax  losses.  Synergy,
Merger and Acquisition  Activity  the concept by which two firms combine  and in-
crease their value, may be achieved  by these cost
Merger  and  acquisition  activity  has  been an  reductions (Cooke).
important  area of study since  1950  when  George  Efficiency  gains  also  may  be  achieved  by
Stigler  wrote  Monopoly  and  Oligopoly  By  reducing  transactions  costs  through  vertical
Merger.  Since  then,  there  have  been  several  merger. When  an environment  is  complex or un-
studies on the four historical merger waves, those  certain,  the transactions  costs  of negotiating  and
in the 1900s,  late  1920s,  late  1960s and  1980s, all  enforcing  contracts are high, there is an incentive
with  various  hypotheses  explaining  their  occur-  to merge. By merging,  firms  can reduce  transac-
rence.  Previous  studies  have  focused  mainly  on  tions  costs,  avoid  opportunistic  behavior  and
the manufacturing  and mining industry or the  en-  achieve  more  efficient  governance  by  internaliz-
tire U.S.  economy, due  largely to the availability  ing exchanges (Williamson).
of data.  The majority  of these  studies  deal  with
multiple  causes  since  few  principal  cause  hy-  Managerial Motives
potheses  have  been  put  forth  (Gort).  Principal
cause  models  suggest  one  primary  motive  for  Managerial motives range  from profit to per-
mergers  while multiple  cause hypotheses  rely  on  sonal. Managers  may want to maximize  revenue
a combination of the motivating factors. Principal  or pursue growth  maximization.  Growth maximi-
cause models have met with little success because  zation  may be  achieved  by  acquiring  new  firms
they  apply  only under  limited  circumstances  and  which  are  experiencing  rapid  growth
provide  little insight into general merger trends. It  (Beckenstein). Managers  also may find it cheaper
is  widely  accepted  that  most  mergers  are  con-  to acquire growth  rather than to develop  new ar-
trolled  by  multiple motives  since  several  parties  eas,  especially  when growth  is desired  in  foreign
are  involved.  Hence,  multiple  cause  models  are  markets.  Mergers  may  also  allow  managers  to
used most often.  reduce risk and increase returns through diversifi-
Although  numerous  and  diverse  determi-  cation.
nants  have  been  examined,  the  majority  fit  into  Managerial  self-interest  is  recognized  as  a
four  categories:  efficiency,  managerial,  monop-  potentially  key  factor  determining  mergers.
oly,  and  speculative  gains.  Mueller,  recognizing  Achampong  and  Zemedkun  found  managers
these  broad  motives,  states  "if firms  maximize  achieve  similar benefits through  either merger  or
profit,  mergers  will  take  place  only  when  they  promotions. By gaining control of a larger corpo-
produce  some  increase  in  market  power,  when  ration  through  merger,  managers  increase  their
they produce a technological  or managerial  econ-  sphere  of  influence  as  well  as  their  salaries.
omy of scale, or when the managers of the acquir-  Cooke  concurs  stating  "managers  may  wish  to
ing  firm  possess  some  special  insight  into  the  expand their  enterprises,  since their salaries,  per-
opportunities  for profit in the acquired firm which  quisites and status often increase with size."
neither its managers nor its stockholders possess."
Monopolistic  Motives
Efficiency  Gains
Profitability  and  size  (dominance)  are  con-
Mergers  allow  firms  to  take  advantage  of  sidered  to  be  basic  merger  motives  (Goldberg).
economies  of  scale  where  existing  firms  in the  Carlton  and Perloff state  "if a sufficient  number
industry  are  operating  at  levels  below  optimum  of firms in one industry merge, the resulting firm
capacity.  Indivisibility  of overhead,  asset  fixity,  would  face  less  competition  and  acquire  addi-
or  labor specialization  are  factors which  contrib-  tional  market  power."  The high  degree  of corre-
ute to economies of scale. Further cost reductions  lation  between  increased  market  share  and
may  be  achieved  by  lowering  bureaucratic  or  increased profits is widely accepted.  According to
transportation  costs.  Reductions  in tax costs  also  Mueller,  this motive  is prevalent  across  all  three
may be  achieved by  taking  advantage  of unused  types of mergers - horizontal, vertical  and con-Adams, Love, and Capps, Jr.  Structural  Analysis of Mergers and  Acquisitions  5
glomerate.  Not only can firms  gain  market share  knowledge  that  low  antitrust  activity  creates  a
but also they  may be  in a better position to deter  favorable climate for their occurrence.
entry. If a firm can increase market share through  Growth rate of the economy and of an indus-
horizontal  merger, they may find collusion,  either  try  are also  suggested  as  motives  for merger  ac-
tacit  or  explicit,  more  effective.  Coupling  collu-  tivity.  Growth of the  economy may  have a posi-
sion with cost reductions  may allow firms to erect  tive effect  on mergers  because  there  is  typically
barriers  to  entry.  Vertical  mergers  can  increase  more capital available. Industry growth  is impor-
market  power  by  providing  a  captive  outlet  for  tant  to  merger  activity  because  firms  want  to
the  products of a firm  one  step forward  or back-  maintain growing  markets.  Hence,  existing firms
ward  in  the  production  chain.  Vertical  merger  in an  industry may want to acquire  firms  experi-
may also  allow  the firm  to exercise  third  degree  encing  faster  growth.  Firms  outside  an  industry
price  discrimination,  thereby  raising  profits  may want to acquire  firms  in a  fast growing  in-
(Perry). Vertical  mergers may  also help deter en-  dustry to maintain growth and diversify.
try  by  requiring  a  potential  entrant  to  enter  all  With all of the hypothesized  determinants  of
markets in which a firm  operates to compete  ef-  mergers, there seems to be no general  consensus
fectively.  Conglomerate  mergers  can  increase  as  to  which  are  the  most  important.  Studies  of
market power and  deter  entrants  if they provide  aggregate  merger activity have revealed  little in-
captive markets for each firms' products.  formation  regarding  which motives  are  decisive
in  accounting  for levels  of merger activity.  Con-
Speculative  Motives  sequently, a detailed review of previous empirical
studies is not given. However, a detailed descrip-
Gort's  theory  of  economic  disturbance  ar-  tion  of  previous  time-series  studies  on  merger
gues that  forces  which  generate  discrepancies  in  activity is provided in Golbe and White.
valuation are decisive in determining variations  in  Specific  to  the  food  industry,  Connor  and
merger rates both among industries and over time.  Geithman  provide a qualitative review of motives
Golbe  and White further contend  that "periods  in  for  mergers  and  acquisitions.  They  cite  profit
which  there  are  greater  divergences  in  opinion  maximization,  gains  in  efficiency,  reduced  risk,
about  companies'  future  prospects  are  also  peri-  increased  market  power,  ease  of financing  and
ods  in which the  level of merger  and acquisition  managerial  hubris  as potential  motives for merg-
activity  is likely to be  greater."  These periods  of  ers.  While  they  provide  a  thorough  review  of
uncertainty  stem  from  the  introduction  of new  previous  studies  which  analyze  general  merger
technology or unexpected exogenous shocks to an  motives, they do  not conduct  independent  analy-
industry.  sis of determinants affecting merger activity.
A second speculative  incentive, referred to as
the bargain theory, states that mergers occur when  Characteristics of the Food Industry
potential  purchasers  believe  that  asset's  current
prices  constitute  "bargains."  Merger  activity  By understanding  the  special  characteristics
should  be  greater  when  prices  of existing  firms  of the food  industry, we  can  discover which  de-
are  low  relative to new  asset prices. Melicher  et  terminants of merger  activity  are  most  likely  to
al.  also  find speculative  motives to be  an impor-  apply.  By  examining  each  of the  four  sectors,
tant  factor  affecting  merger  activity.  They  find  processing,  wholesaling, retailing  and  food  serv-
merger  activity  increases  with  expectations  of  ice, we can discover  if each subsector is likely to
economic  growth as measured by stock prices.  respond  to the same determinants.  First, the food
industry as a whole is discussed  and then  specif-
Additional Motives  ics of each sector are examined.
The  food  industry  focuses  on  consumer
In  addition  to  these  broad  categories,  anti-  products.  Competition  is based on both price and
trust activity seems to play a role in merger activ-  non-price  aspects, depending  on the sector. Price
ity. Most studies do not consider antitrust activity  competition is simply offering the lowest possible
as  a primary  factor  motivating  mergers,  but  ac-  price  to  consumers  while  non-price  competition6  July 1997  Journal  ofFood Distribution  Research
includes  product  innovation  and  differentiation.  retailing  increases  significantly  at  the  regional
Non-price  competition  leads  to new product  pro-  level.  For  food  service,  sales  of the  25  largest
liferation.  For example,  over  16,800 new grocery  franchised  chains  accounted  for  64%  of  sales
products were  introduced in 1993 and over 20,000  while  the  top  4  largest  chains  accounted  for
were introduced in 1994.  nearly 30% of sales.  Food manufacturers  ranked
The entire food industry is highly leveraged,  tenth  among  20  manufacturing  industries  in
labor intensive  and  highly  profitable.  According  shares of sales controlled by the top 50 firms.
to the Food Marketing Review, the equity to debt
ratio  for  food  manufacturers  averaged  0.91  in  Model  Development
1992  compared to 1.23  for all manufacturing cor-
porations.  Equity to debt for  food manufacturers  By comparing characteristics  of the food  in-
remained  steady  in  1993  and  1994.  For food re-  dustry  with previous  hypothesized  determinants,
tailing, the equity to  debt ratio  averaged  0.36  in  it is clear that some of the same determinants may
1992  compared  to  0.62 for  all  retailers. In  1993  apply. It is also clear there  are differences  which
and  1994 the equity to debt ratio for the food re-  need  evaluation.  Determinants  which  should  be
tailing sector  increased to 0.42  and  0.53,  respec-  similar to other  industries are  discussed and  then
tively. Labor is the single salient cost of the food  determinants which are specific to the food indus-
industry,  capturing  34.5  cents  of  every  dollar  try  are hypothesized.  Hypothesized  determinants
spent on food marketing. Even with these factors,  for each of the four sectors, processing,  wholesal-
the food  industry  is  perennially  one  of the  most  ing, retailing and food service, are also put forth.
profitable  in  the  U.S.  economy,  making  excess  These  four sectors  are  modeled  separately  to  al-
cash  prevalent.  The food  processing  sector, food  low for differences  within the food  industry. It is
retailing sector and food service sectors remained  important to note that no attempt  is made to  dif-
highly profitable even  in 1991  and  1992 when the  ferentiate among  horizontal, vertical  or conglom-
rest of the economy  suffered  a recession. In  1993  erate merger and acquisition activity.
and  1994  profits  for  both  food  processors  and  Like other industrial  sectors, the food  indus-
food retailers were at record levels,  try  as  a  whole  is  subject  to  general  economic
From  a global perspective,  the U.S.  food in-  conditions  and  antitrust  laws.  Merger  activity  is
dustry  is the leading  international  food system  in  expected  to increase  as the  economy  grows.  De-
terms  of foreign  trade,  investment  and  sales  of  pending  on the nature of the  law  and vigor with
foreign subsidiaries. In 1992, the U.S. food  indus-  which  it  is enforced,  antitrust  laws may  also  ef-
try showed its first trade surplus, $1.6 billion, in a  feet  merger  activity.  As  antitrust  activity  in-
decade.  This surplus  increased  to  $2.3  billion  in  creases, merger activity should decrease.
1993  and  2.5  billion  in  1994.  While  large  food  The  food  industry  also  is  not isolated  from
processors exported  on average  4% of sales,  27%  speculative  motives.  Differences  in  opinion  re-
of total sales came  from plants  located  in foreign  garding valuation and future prospects of firms is
countries. Increased globalization,  combined with  prevalent  in the food industry. If firms are viewed
high leverage  and labor  intensity make the  food  as  bargains,  merger  activity  should  increase.  In
industry  sensitive  to  movements  in  wages  and  addition,  the  food  industry  is  subject  to  effi-
prices,  interest  rates  and  the  value  of the  U.S.  ciency,  managerial  and  monopolistic  concerns
dollar.  like  other  industrial  sectors,  but  the. underlying
All four sectors  are highly concentrated.  The  motives  are  different.  Efficiency  concerns  are
wholesale  industry  saw  massive  restructuring  important  across  the  food  industry  due  to  labor
during  the  late  eighties  resulting  in  fewer  but  intensity  and  cost  of  equipment.  As  efficiency
larger firms. For food distributors  the five largest  increases,  the  need to merge  should  be  lessened.
firms accounted  for 82%  of sales,  and for whole-  Profitability  and  high debt-to-equity  are manage-
sale clubs, the top  five  firms  accounted  for 95%  rial concerns  which effect  all sectors of the food
of sales.  Food  retailing  is  less  concentrated  na-  industry.  Increased  profitability  and  decreased
tionally,  with  the  20  largest  grocery  chains  ac-  debt-to-equity  should increase  merger  activity  as
counting  for  40%  of  sales.  Concentration  inAdams, Love,  and Capps, Jr.  Structural  Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions  7
financing  becomes  less  difficult  and  firms  be-  globalization;  PP = product  proliferation;  E = ef-
come more attractive.  ficiency;  SS = store size; FSH = food away from
A further managerial motive is globalization.  home share; AD = advertising;  and si, i = 1, 2,...4
The food industry is experiencing rapid expansion  are random errors.
into foreign  markets which  should  affect merger
activity,  particularly  in the  processing  and  food  Data
service  sectors.  The  processing  and  food  service
sectors  also  are  affected  by advertising  expendi-  To analyze  merger activity  and acquisitions
tures.  Firms  may  need  to  merge  as  advertising  in the food industry, we employ annual data from
expenditures increase to take advantage of greater  1972  to  1994.  Intrayear  data  were  not  available
distributional  expertise  and  resource  availability.  for analysis. Descriptive  statistics are provided  in
The practice  of small firms  introducing  products  Tables  1 and  2.  The  number of mergers  and  ac-
at a local or regional  level and then selling out to  quisitions  in each of the four  sectors  of the food
larger firms who then expand product distribution  industry, the dependent variables  in this  analysis,
is prevalent in the food industry.  will be used as proxies for merger and acquisition
Growth  concerns  also  are  important  in  the  activity.  The number of mergers  and acquisitions
food  sectors.  In  retailing there  is  a trend  toward  are  available  in various  issues of the Food Mar-
larger,  all  purpose  stores.  Increasing  store  size  keting  Review  published  by  the  Economic  Re-
raises capital requirements for the retailing sector.  search  Service  (ERS)  and  in  the Food Retailing
As  a  result,  mergers  in  the  retailing  sector  may  Review  available  from  the  Food  Institute.  The
rise  as  store  size  increases.  Processing  is  likely  number of firms is available  in the Survey of  Cur-
affected  by  increased  product  proliferation.  As  rent Business. Product proliferation, measured by
new products are introduced, the need to diversify  the number of new  products introduced,  is  avail-
through  merger  is reduced.  The food  service  in-  able  in  the Food Marketing Review.  The  food-
dustry  is  experiencing  rapid  growth  due  to  in-  away-from-home  share  of the total food dollar  is
creasing  consumption  of  food-away-from-home.  also available in the Food  Marketing Review. Av-
As  the food-away-from-home  share  of the  total  erage  new  store  size  is  from the Food Retailing
food dollar increases,  merger activity in the food  Review. Efficiency, measured  as an index of out-
service sector should rise.  put per worker, is available through the Bureau of
To  summarize,  the  models  for  examining  Labor Statistics.
determinants  of merger  activity  in the four  food  Debt-to-equity  is  measured  as  the  ratio  of
industry sectors are hypothesized as follows:  total debt  to stockholders  equity.  Profitability  is
measured as  a percentage  of total  sales. Debt-to-
Processing mergers =  equity  and  profitability  measures  are  available
through  RMA  Annual Statement Studies. Profit-
fi ( A, EH, P. DE, E, SB, G, AD, PP) +  E1  ability and debt-to-equity ratios for the processing
sector are obtained by averaging the ratios for the
Wholesaling mergers =  following  seven processing  subsectors:  bread  and
f2 (A,  EH, P, DE, SB, E, PP) +  2  other  baked  goods;  canned  and  dried  fruits  and
vegetables;  dairy; flour and  other grain mills;  red
Retailing mergers =  meat;  poultry;  and  sausage.  General  economic
health is measured by the gross domestic product,
3 (A, EH, P, DE, E, SB, AD, SS)+  83  and globalization is proxied by U.S. direct foreign
investment.  The gross  domestic product and U.S.
Food service mergers =  direct foreign investment are expressed  in billions
f4 (A, EH, P, DE, E, SB, AD, G, FSH) +84  and  millions of dollars,  respectively.  These vari-
ables  are in the  Survey of Current Business. Ad-
where:  A = antitrust  climate;  EH  = general eco-  vertising  data  are  from  the  Ad  $  Summary.
nomic health;  P = profitability;  DE = debt to eq-  Advertising  is  total  media  expenditures  and  is
uity;  SB  =  speculative  or  bargain  factor;  G  =  expressed  in  millions  of dollars.  As  a proxy  for8  July 1997  Journal  of  Food  Distribution  Research
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics - Levels  of Variables.
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation
Gross Domestic Product (Billions)  3617.3  531.98
Processing Mergers  229.18  54.65
Retail Mergers  41.95  19.81
Food Service Mergers  52.13  20.64
Processing Establishments  21902  1852.6
Retail Establishments  174170  17332
Food Service Establishments  333160  71414
Processing Ratio of Mergers to Establishments  0.041  0.025
Retail Ratio of Mergers to Establishments  0.0006  0.0004
Food Service Ratio of Mergers to Establishments  0.017  0.043
Processing Profitability (% of sales)  2.61  0.41
Retail Profitability (%  of sales)  1.40  0.42
Food Service Profitability  (% of sales)  3.36  1.27
Processing Debt-to-Equity Ratio  1.63  0.17
Retail Debt-to-Equity Ratio  0.49  0.07
Food Service Debt-to-Equity Ratio  0.38  0.08
Processing Ratio of Stock Price to Book Value  3.03  1.71
Retail Ratio of Stock Price to Book Value  10.47  26.93
Food Service Ratio of Stock Price to Book Value  3.38  1.21
Processor U.S. Direct Foreign Investment (Millions)  10886  30.136
Food Service U.S. Direct Foreign Investment (Millions)  2016  7.07
Processor Advertising (Millions)  2344.22  391.49
Food Service Advertising (Millions)  813.19  385.31
Processing New Products Introduced  6679.8  3770.2
Retail Average New Store Size (Sq. Ft.)  36116  5155.9
Food Service Food-Away-From-Home  Share (%)  41.236  3.54
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics - Percentage Growth Rate of Variables.
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation
Gross Domestic Product  1.86  4.08
Processing Profitability  1.43  20.59
Retail Profitability  2.09  24.41
Food Service Profitability  -3.40  12.44
Processing Debt to Equity  1.07  8.08
Retail Debt to Equity  -1.30  7.87
Food Service Debt to Equity  -2.54  9.95
Processing Ratio of Stock Price to Book Value  2.24  22.78
Retail Ratio of Stock Price to Book Value  -22.77  131.82
Food Service Ratio of Stock Price to Book Value  -5.59  22.89
Processor U.S. Direct Foreign Investment  4.18  9.38
Food Service U.S. Direct Foreign Investment  4.30  1.09
Processor Advertising  5.43  15.50
Food service Advertising  9.05  9.05
Processing New Products Introduced  8.93  6.53
Retail Average New Store Size  0.34  8.23
Food Service Food-Away-From-Home  Share  1.16  1.69Adams, Love, and Capps, Jr.  Structural  Analysis of  Mergers and  Acquisitions  9
speculative  motives or the bargain  theory, the ra-  merger decisions.  It  is assumed that  a merger  in
tio of the industry's  stock price index to its book  time  period t  is  based  on  information  from  the
value  is used. Both measures  are  available  in the  previous time period. Further, decisions are influ-
Standard  and Poor's  Analysts Handbook.  enced more by changes in the associated variables
rather than actual levels. Antitrust activity and the
Estimation Technique  stock price to book value are modeled contempo-
raneously  due  to  the  idea  that  antitrust  activity
Due  to the discrete  nature of the dependent  and value of the merging firms at the actual time
variable, the logit form of regression analysis will  of the  merger  or acquisition  are  most important.
be employed  (Intriligator).  This  form is given by  The  new  products  variable  in  the  processing
ln(p/(l-p))  = XP +v  where p = the proportion  of  equation,  average  new  store  size  in  the retailing
mergers  which  occur,  X  =  the  set  of predeter-  equation  and the  food-away-from-home  share  in
mined variables,  and  p = the coefficients  associ-  the food  service  equation  are  lagged  but  left  in
ated  with  the  predetermined  variables.  v  is  a  levels  to  capture  the  trends  occurring  in  each
stochastic  disturbance  term with variance  Var(vi)  sector.  Output  per  worker,  the  proxy  for  effi-
=  l/(ripi(l-pi))  where  ri  is  the  number  of estab-  ciency,  is  omitted  due  to  collinearity  problems
lishments  in  period  i  and  Pi  is  the  relative  fre-  between  it and  profitability.  Antitrust climate  is
quency  of  mergers  in  period  i.  Because  the  measured  using  a dummy variable,  which  is  one
disturbance  term  is  heteroskedastic,  generalized  for  years  1981  through  1989.  This  demarcation
or weighted  least  squares  is  employed.  Since  the  corresponds  to  relaxed  enforcement  of antitrust
form  of the heteroskedasticity  is  known, weights  laws  during  the  eighties  under  the  Reagan  Ad-
for each observation  are computed  as the inverse  ministration (Marion  and Kim).
of the square root of the variance.  Alternative  measures  of  antitrust  activity
Greene  defines  the marginal  effects  associ-  were  attempted,  but  they  were  beset  with  prob-
ated with the logit model as  y=A([P'X)(1-A(3'X)P  lems. To illustrate, in following  Preston and  Con-
where  A(3'X)=eP'X/(l+eP'X).  The  values  of  the  nor, the  use  of the number of professional  hours
marginal  effects  will  vary with  the regressors  in  charged to antitrust matters  by the Federal  Trade
X. In this analysis X is evaluated at the means of  Commission  was  examined.  However,  data  for
the  regressors.  The  standard  errors  associated  the majority of the years covered  in this analysis
with the marginal  effects  can be  computed using  were  unavailable  making  this  option  infeasible.
the Delta method and are given by,  The  number  of  merger  investigations  initiated
was  also  tried  as  a  proxy  for  antitrust  activity.
Asy. Var [y] =  This  specification  introduced right-hand-side  en-
(A(P'X)(l-A(3'X))2[I+(1-2A(P'X))PX '] dogeneity  concerns  and  thus  also  was  deemed
V[I+(1-2A(3'X))  3 X']'  inappropriate.  The  use of the dummy variable  is
further justified  by a  study done  by Preston  and
where V = Asy. Var[3].  Connor which found "a severe attenuation of anti-
trust  under  the  Reagan  Administration"  corre-
Although  the  individual  sectors  of the food  sponding to the years  1981 through  1989.
industry  are  modeled  separately,  it  is  assumed
that their disturbances  are linked.  To capture  this  Empirical Results
correlation,  we  employ  a  seemingly  unrelated
regression (SUR) approach together with the logit  The  estimated  coefficients  and  marginal  ef-
form  of regression  analysis.  In  estimation,  the  fects  for the model  are exhibited  in Tables  3 and
wholesaling  sector equation  is  omitted since data  4,  respectively.  About  96,  69 and  93  percent  of
are  not  available.  All  right-hand-side  regressors  the variability  in the relative  frequency  of merg-
except antitrust activity,  stock price to book value  ers were accounted for by the predetermined vari-
ratios and trend variables are expressed as the lag  ables  in the models  for  the  processing,  retailing
of the growth rate of the respective variable.  This  and food  service  sectors, respectively.  The coef-
lag representation  reflects the timing and basis of  ficient for real  gross domestic  product was  posi-10  July 1997  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
Table 3. Estimated Coefficients.
Processing Sector  Retailing Sector  Food Service Sector
Variable  Coefficient  t-ratio  Coefficient  t-ratio  Coefficient  t-ratio
Antitrust Climate  0.69*a  6.91  0.37*  2.02  .89*  10.60
Real Gross Domestic Product  2.62*  2.79  3.41*  2.19  1.84*  3.11
Debt to Equity  -1.21*  -1.49  -0.37  -0.31  -0.95*  -4.55
Ratio of Stock Price to Book Value  0.02  0.26  -0.002  -0.12  .42*  11.31
Profitability  0.33*  1.53  -0.45*  -1.83  1.33*  5.00
New Products  0.0002*  6.01  --  - -
Globalization  0.44  0.64  ----  ----  0.09  0.14
Advertising  0.21  0.46  ----  ----  1.24*  3.22
Food-Away-From-Home  Share  ----  ----  ----  ----  0.18*  11.53
Average New Store Size  ----  ----  0.00003*  1.61  -- 
Constant  -4.83*  -55.68  -9.18*  -14.17  -15.96*  -27.40
R-Square Statisticb  0.96  0.69  0.93
a  Asterisk denotes statistical significance at the .10 level.
b From non-weighted regression.
Table 4. Estimated Marginal Effects  and Associated  Standard Errors.
Processing  Sector  Retailing Sector  Food Service Sector
Marginal  Standard  Marginal  Standard  Marginal  Standard
Variable  Effect  Error  Effect  Error  Effect  Error
Antitrust Climate  0.17  0.02  0.07  0.03  0.21  0.02
Real Gross Domestic Product  0.65  0.23  0.69  0.31  0.43  0.14
Debt to Equity  -0.30  0.20  -0.07  0.24  -0.22  0.03
Ratio of Stock Price to Book Value  0.004  0.01  -0.0003  0.003  0.09  0.01
Profitability  0.08  0.05  -0.09  0.05  0.31  0.06
New Products  4.9E-06  8.22E-06  ----  ---- 
Globalization  0.11  0.17  ----  ----  0.03  0.17
Advertising  0.05  0.11  ----  ----  0.29  0.09
Food-Away-From-Home  Share  ----  ----  ----  ----  0.04  0.004
Average New Store Size  ----  ----  6.24E-06  3.88E-06  ---- 
tive  and  significant  for all three sectors,  support-  Profitability was positive  and  significant  for
ing  the  idea  that  as  the  economy  grows  more  the processing  and  food  service  sectors  but was
capital  is  available  for financing  merger activity.  negative  and  significant  for  the  food  retailing
Merger  activity  across  all  sectors  was  more  re-  sector.  The food service  sector  was the most  re-
sponsive  to  changes  in  the  growth  of  the  real  sponsive with a one percent change in the growth
gross domestic product than all other variables. A  of profitability  leading to  a  0.31  increase  in  the
one percent change in the growth of GDP leads to  proportion of firms involved in merger activity as
an increase  in the proportion of firms  engaged in  compared to 0.08 for the processing sector. A one
merger  activity  in  the  following  year  by  0.65,  percent  change  in  the  growth  of profitability  in
0.69 and 0.43 in the processing,  retailing and food  the food retailing  sector led to  a 0.09  decrease  in
service sectors, respectively.  This result  indicates  the proportion of firms merged. It is not surpris-
merger  activity will increase  with continued eco-  ing that the  food retailing sector  responds  differ-
nomic growth.  ently  to  changes  in  profitability  than  the  food
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ers perennially  have  operated  with smaller profit  processing and food service sectors to increase by
margins than the food service and food processing  0.05 and 0.29, respectively. This finding indicates
sectors,  leading  to increased  consolidation  in the  it  is more  important  for  food  service  firms  than
food  retailing  industry  to  capture  economies  of  food processing firms to spread the cost of adver-
scale.  As profit margins  increase  in  the  food  re-  tising expenses  through merger.  Food processing
tailing  sector  the  need  to  consolidate  through  firms can spread the cost of advertising  over sev-
merger  is reduced.  The food processing  and  food  eral  products,  while  food  service  firms  typically
service  sectors,  on the  other hand,  have  enjoyed  only advertise for one product.
greater profitability, making them more attractive  The  effect of globalization  was  insignificant
to investors  both inside  and  outside the  industry,  for  both  the  food  service  and  food  processing
The positive  effect  of increasing  profitability  on  sectors.  This result  indicates firms  are not merg-
merger  activity  on the  food processing  and  food  ing as a result of expansion  into foreign markets.
service sectors  supports the hypothesis that man-  For the food service  industry this result is proba-
agers seek growth  in profitability.  Increased prof-  bly due  to the  fact that  there  is  no  comparable
itability  in  these  two  sectors  may  make  them  industry  in  foreign  markets.  Food  service  firms
more attractive to outside firms trying to diversify  have  few  opportunities  to  merge  with  foreign
and reduce risk. If these two sectors remain prof-  firms to enter new markets because few exist. The
itable, merger activity should be expected  to con-  opposite  is  true  for  food  processing  firms.  The
tinue.  food  processing  industry  in Europe  is  extensive
The  coefficient  associated  with  debt-to-  and many multinational food processing firms are
equity was negative  as expected for all three sec-  in operation. Globalization may not be a factor in
tors but not significant  for the retailing sector.  A  food processing mergers because the industry has
one percent change in the growth of debt to equity  long been doing business internationally.
resulted  in  a  0.30  and  0.22  decrease  in the pro-  The  ratio of stock price index to book value
portion  of  merged  firms  in  the food  processing  was insignificant  for the food processing and food
and  food  service  sectors,  respectively.  Debt-to-  retailing  sectors  but was  positive  and significant
equity  is  also related  to managerial  motives.  As  for the food service  sector. A one unit change  in
food processing  and  food  service  firms  become  the  ratio  of the  stock price  index  to book  value
more  leveraged  they  become  less  attractive  results  in  a  0.09  increase  in  the  proportion  of
merger  or  acquisition  targets.  Further,  financing  firms merged  in  the food  service  sectors.  A  one
becomes  more  difficult  as  debt-to-equity  in-  unit change  in the ratio of the stock price index to
creases.  As  food  processing  and  food  service  book value  results in a 0.003  decrease  in the pro-
firms  become  more  leveraged,  fewer  mergers  portion of firms  merged in  the food retailing  in-
should take place.  dustry,  albeit  not  statistically  significant.  This
Antitrust climate was positive and significant  result  indicates  the  "Bargain"  theory  does  not
across  all  three  sectors.  The  proportion  of firms  play a significant  role  in  determining  merger ac-
merged  in  the  processing,  retailing  and  food  tivity  in the  food  industry,  all  other things  held
service  sectors  increased  by 0.17,  0.07  and  0.21,  constant. In fact, the result from  the food  service
respectively,  as a result of the change  in antitrust  sector supports Melicher's  et al.  idea that merger
enforcement  during  the  Reagan  Administration.  activity  increases  with  expectations  of economic
This  result  indicates  antitrust  enforcement  does  growth as indicated by increasing stock prices.
play a significant role in merger activity across all  The trend variables for all sectors were  posi-
sectors  of the food industry. Future merger activ-  tive  and  significant.  A  one  unit  change  in  the
ity in the food  industry could  be reduced if anti-  food-away-from-home  share  of  the  total  food
trust enforcement is increased.  dollar  causes  the  proportion  of mergers  in  the
Advertising expenditures have a positive  and  food service  sectors to increase by 0.04. Increases
significant effect on the food service  sector but is  in the number of new products  and  average  new
insignificant for the food processing sector. A one  store  size  cause  minimal  impacts  on the propor-
percent  increase  in  advertising  expenditures  re-  tion of firms merged  in  the food  processing  and
sults  in  the  proportion  of  mergers  in  the  food  food  retailing  sectors,  respectively.  All  three12  July 1997  Journal  of  Food Distribution  Research
trends  reflect  growth  in  the  industry  which  in-  can,  however,  be  avoided  through  appropriate
creases  attractiveness  to  firms  looking  to  maxi-  enforcement of antitrust laws.
mize  growth.  As  more  new  products  are  The  results  do  provide  insight  into  future
introduced,  stores  become  larger  and  the  food-  trends  in  merger  activity.  Improved  results  may
away-from-home  share  of the  total  food  dollar  be obtained  through refining the measurement  of
increases  merger activity in the food industry will  antitrust activity and  inclusion of the wholesaling
increase.  As  consumer  demands  are  likely  to  sector.  Further  refinements  also  can be  made  by
cause these trends to continue,  merger  activity  in  disaggregating  by type  of merger  activity.  With
the food industry should also  be expected to con-  the high degree  of impact merger activity  has  on
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